Essay

THE RATTLE OF SOVIET SKELETONS

Living in Ukraine, particularly since the poorly disguised Russian invasion began last April, has taught me a lot of what the Soviet Union must have been like.

Petty gangsters and vain nobodies are elevated to positions of power and status. When their Russian handlers disapprove of them, they are murdered in the street (like “Batman”), or simply vanish. Some have reappeared in Moscow doing interviews with Russian media.

Early in the Crimean invasion, a Tartar activist, Reshat Ametov, was kidnapped and his body was found covered with signs of torture. He died a painful, horrible death.

Early in the invasion of Donbas, a local, pro-Ukrainian politician, Volodymyr Rybak, was kidnapped and his body found covered with signs of torture. The reason they lead with such savagery is spelled out in Lenin’s infamous 1918 hand-written hanging order: “Do it in such a fashion that for hundreds of kilometres around the people might see, tremble.”

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One of the biggest WTF moments of the Ukraine crisis was this demonstration by New York City’s lesbian gay trans bisexual & queer community in support of the “separatists” (who are mostly Russian-hired mercenaries, led by Russian GRU agents). The “separatists” are violently anti-gay.

At various times, Russia’s ever-changing propaganda centered on “protecting” Ukraine from European homosexuality. Sergei Aksyonov, the de facto leader of Russian-annexed Crimea has said “We do not need such people [homosexuals]. . . . Our police and self-defense forces will react immediately and in three minutes will explain to them what kind of sexual orientation they should stick to.”

http://romaninukraine.com/when-your-former-libertarian-hero-calls-you-a-nazi/

Decentralize Ukraine
by Roman Skaskiw

Solving Ukraine’s two biggest problems — corruption and security — has everything to do with decentralization. Here’s how:

1) Corruption. (A basic lesson in incentives.)

Bribes are a public sector phenomenon. On the rare occasions that bribes exist in the private sector, they are usually a crime by employees against the business owner. The effects of bribes in the private sector are not very destructive because business owners have a strong incentive to police their employees. Those who fail do not remain business owners very long. See my essay, “A Theory of Bribes” on the Mises Institute website (http://mises.org/daily/4744) for a detailed explanation.

Bribes become destructive in sectors where competition is severely restricted, namely, in services provided by the government: security, justice, education, government medicine. Nobody in the bureaucratic hierarchies providing these services suffers negative consequences from abusing the recipients of their services the way private business owners do. Their salaries depend not on voluntary patronage, but on taxes and monies allocated from the national budget. There is no threat of bankruptcy until the entire nation faces bankruptcy.

Exposing as many of Ukraine’s services to the competition of the market place (privatizing the education system, for example) will reduce corruption. This is consistent with the general recommendations of Former Georgian Economic Development Minister Kakha Bendukidze who is now an advisor to President Poroshenko.

Short of outright privatization, solving social problems on the Oblast level instead of the national level would also dramatically reduce corruption.

When taxes, road repair, security, justice, pensions, and education systems are managed on a local level, regional differences emerge in the quality of these services. People more quickly determine which policies and which politicians are effective. People and business gain the ability to vote with their feet and move to better administered regions.

The reason German feudalism was so much more benign than feudalism under the Russian Czar is because Germany consisted of literally thousands of geographically small political entities and peasants fled from unjust lords to better ones. There were consequences for abuse and mismanagement. (See How The West Grew Rich by Rosenberg, Birdzell, or The Rise and Decline of the State by Creveld.)

Regional variation combined with the possibility of migration provides a mechanism that punishes poor administration.

This is a very European idea. The history of Europe is one of decentralization and local autonomy and these norms extending well into Ukraine, where many cities and down adopted the Magdeburg Rights. There is a monument to these self-governance laws in Kyiv, though I suspect few people know its significance.

Decentralization should not be considered federalization or an attempt to fracture the country. It should be considered the necessary exposure of critical services to competition — either the capitalist competition of the market place, or regional competition between governors. It should be a presented as an expression of confidence in the Ukrainian people and a return to Ukraine’s historic role as a freer alternative to Russian oppression.

2) Security. Military bureaucracies are the centralization solution to problem of security. Militias and an armed society are the decentralized solution.

Military bureaucracies retain the advantage of coordinating resources, but at the expense of freedom of action. Militias make decisions and act on them much more quickly.

When facing an enemy like Russia with its sophisticated intelligence network, military bureaucracies have an additional disadvantage of being more easily compromised and corrupted, betrayed by their leadership.

Militias also have the “advantage” of non-accountability. The government enabling them can more easily deny direct accountability for the worst actions of the militia, as Russia has been doing in Eastern Ukraine.

In the long-term, militias also have the advantage of being cost effective. Men will always to be willing to purchase arms and seek basic training at their own expense. Militaries, on the other hand, will always consume enormous budgets and the acquisition of new technology will always be fraught with corruption, especially after the pressure of an enemy has subsided.

Over the course of the last decade, the militia has caught up with the military regarding one of its historic advantages: battlefield awareness, especially where the battlefield is populated by civilians. The communication structures of military bureaucracies are rivaled by readily available modern technology and information sharing.

Today, many Ukrainians seem eager to defend their country. Ukraine’s leadership should do the bold thing and let them. This means allowing a legal channel for their freedom of action. Instead of acting as generals, Ukraine’s leadership needs to adopt the role of cheerleader. They can facilitate the defense of the country with a declaration like this one:

“If you want a rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition, bring your passport and $300 to Maidan. Take a four hour course with a hundred other people. We’ll stamp your passport, and you can have an AK47 from storage. One stamp per person. Period. Training held twice a day until people stop coming. Proceeds from the sales will go toward equipping the Ukrainian military.”

Alternatively, Ukraine can simply legalize the purchase and sale of firearms.

This would deal a fatal blow to the centerpiece of Russia’s foreign policy strategy — intimidation. This strategy was explicitly mention in the instructions of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) to Russian Spetsnaz in Eastern Ukraine which were intercepted in late April (http://euromaidanpr.com/2014/04/28/instructions-for-separatists-in-eastern-ukraine-intercepted-use-women-as-a-voluntary-shield/).

People with the means to defend themselves are not easily intimidated.

Admittedly, an armed society would be a significant cultural shift that raises understandable concerns. The reason gun ownership has such a negative association is because most gun owners are criminals. The most honest, law abiding members of society are the ones least likely to purchase black market guns, or to risk the legal pitfalls and ambiguities associated with official gun ownership.

Any serious analysis of this course of action must consider the results of many scientific studies of armed societies. Most recently, a comprehensive study published Volume 30, Number 2 of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy compared gun laws and violent crime in European countries. (http://theacru.org/acru/harvard_study_gun_control_is_counterproductive/) The study, like many earlier ones, found a negative correlation. More guns mean less crime.

Interestingly, Russia emerged in this study as the stark example of a country with extremely strict gun laws and a high murder rate: four times higher than the United States and twenty times higher than Norway. Most murders in Russia don’t involve guns.

The proper context for this message is again a return to Ukraine’s historic role as a freer alternative to Russia: Ukrainians are free people who have the right to defend themselves.

This message, perhaps even more than the guns themselves would be the biggest deterrent to Russian aggression. As this historian Shane O’Rourke wrote in his book The Cossacks:

“[Cossack freedom demonstrated] that an alternative and viable social order did indeed exists. This was to prove far more threatening to Poland-Lithuania or Muscovy and the Russian Empire that the cossack swords and muskets on their own could ever be. . . . Cossack insurgency alway had the potential to explode out of its regional and local character into a matter of kingdom wide significance.”

(previously unpublished essay)

The national myths of Ukraine and Russia are not just different, they are mutually exclusive, and while Ukraine’s can exist without Russia, the Russian idea plunges into an identity crisis without Ukraine.

Both claim the legacy of Kievan Rus, the mythologized and idealized kingdom is considered a well-spring of Slavic culture and Orthodox Christianity. It was obliterated by the Mongols in 1241. Here, the narratives diverge.

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I spent almost a week writing this long essay. It was exhausting, and personally important. I’ve been betrayed by my intellectual tribe — parts of it, anyway.

Last August, I met former Belarusian Presidential candidate Yaroslav Romanchuk at a libertarian conference near Lviv, Ukraine. He was somewhat of a Ron Paul figure, a businessman-turned-politician advocating radical free market reforms in Belarus. The consequences for being a libertarian in or near Russia are much more severe than in the United States. In 1994 he faced pressure: to stay in business he’d have to either join the mafia or join the government. He ended up abandoning the import-export business he had spent years building.

We joked about America’s RT (Russia Today) news service — that the United States government should sponsor a Russian language libertarian channel in Russia and Eastern Europe. The joke, which for us needed no explanation, was that governments can invoke principles of freedom when they undermine a rival government, while simultaneously behaving like a savage tyrant at home. This should not be difficult to understand.

http://romaninukraine.com/putins-libertarians/

See the original article on The Daily Beast. It’s filled with links which I haven’t taken the time to post here.

I watched Putin’s March 19th speech celebrating Russia’s annexation of Crimea in a coffee shop in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv. I watched with a friend who’d been active in the establishment of the Ukrainian state in 1991 and then, as he puts it, decided to disgrace himself by entering politics for a brief period at the city level. He considers himself a patriot and was keenly interested in Putin’s announcement.

To both of us, Putin’s speech seemed disconnected from reality. Here’s one of the more glaring examples:

I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. . . . They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.

None of this is true.

The major violence was sparked on January 20th when the Russian-backed Yanukovych government, without following legislative procedures, criminalized virtually every conceivable form of protest.

The accusations of Nazism, anti-Semitism and Russophobia have been actively and repeatedly denounced by Ukraine’s Jewish community, and by many Russians who took part in the Euro Maidan protests.

Regarding the persistent accusations of hooliganism, one can easily contrast the nature of the pro-Ukrainian protesters with the pro-Russian ones.

Two deaths occurred at the hand of Pro-Russian protesters in Kharkiv – raw footage here.

In Donetsk, pro-Russian protesters broke through police lines and stabbed to death two pro-Ukrainian protesters – the raw footage is here and here is a heartbreaking eye-witness account with subtitles. The victims were locals. It is widely believed that their attackers arrived from Russia. Ukrainian language books have been burned in Crimea and Kharkiv.

Also in Crimea, a Tartar, Reshat Ametov, was found murdered with signs of torture. His friends said he was going to join the Ukrainian military.

There has been no analogous violence directed toward Russians. The hypocrisy of the Kremlin propaganda is unbearable.

For weeks Ukrainians have been wondering how far the Kremlin will go and how they should prepare. Though I wouldn’t curtail any preparation for worst-case scenarios, to my friend and me, Putin’s speech, which condemned pro-Ukrainians as neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites, and attempted to put the invasion in historical context, seemed like a declaration of victory and an attempted consolidation of moral authority, rather than a pre-cursor to more Russian aggression.

It seems that Putin will only attempt to discredit and affect the government in Kyiv by covert means, as discussed by Forbes contributor Paul Gregory.

One can only speculate about Kremlin’s calculations, but here are four that may inform Putin’s future actions.

First, Russia had deep internal divisions. They’ve waged war on two occasions to prevent secession of Chechnya. The invasion of Crimea has sparked huge protests. Dissenters included included university professors, and a former Russian General. If the Russian army advances into new territories domestic unrest will likely increase. By stopping now, Putin will have made a point about Russian power and can turn his attention back to stifling dissent in Russia before the internal protest movements grow into a bigger problem.

For weeks Ukrainians have been wondering how far the Kremlin will go and how they should prepare.

Second, Ukraine has been a tentative ally of Moscow and a huge trading partner,fourth in imports and sixth in export to Russia. Influential oligarchs who have interests in both countries would be harmed by the all out war, which would likely ensue if Putin pressed too hard. Perhaps he also hopes he can keep Ukraine as a borderland instead of having it join NATO.

Third, though Peter Pomerantsev has argued that Russia’s ruling elite may actually have been enriched by recent market turbulence, perhaps Russia is feeling the pressure of investor flight, and, separately, the newly announced sanctions which target influential Russians appear to be significantly more severe and impactful than the last round.

Lastly, Crimea was the easiest target. It is geographically defensible, and had the highest percentage of people who wanted to join Russia: 41%, according as reported by Ukrainian News Channel 24 last month. Substantial, though certainly not the 97% indicated by the referendum.

The subject of Crimea’s considerable Russian minority has been discussed since Ukraine gained independence, and was frequently polled. The 41% reported by Channel 24 is consistent with USAID sponsored polls from 2009, 2011 and 2013. According to them, 40-45% of Crimeans considered themselves Russian, 23-33% believed Crimea should join Russia, and 12% rated relations with Russia as one of the top three issues from a list of 17. Interestingly, it also found that in 2013, 40% of Crimeans do not use the internet.

Channel 24 reported that Ukraine’s Eastern regions had smaller, though still significant Russian minorities. Donetsk 33%, Luhansk 24% and Kharkiv 15%.

The world provides plenty of examples of multi-ethnic regions existing on the border of two countries who claim them. History shows that it’s often only after blood has been shed by both sides that peace is reached, and that the most stable arrangement for these disputed border lands solution seems to be local autonomy (which, incidentally, Crimea had according to the Ukrainian Constitution).

Right now, Ukrainians feel slighted and wary about the future. They want to fight for every inch of their homeland. I hope Russians take this feeling seriously enough to not press further. I hope the anger subsides and local autonomy is granted and diffuses tensions where large ethnic minorities exist. Lastly, I hope that Ukraine’s strategy for self defense includes a determined effort to create a country freer and more prosperous than their tyrannical neighbor. A contrast in standard of living would be the best long-term defense.

The attitude among Ukrainians is promising. The sense of civic duty is soaring, at least here in the Western part of the country. One friend of mine who was on Maidan during the worst days returned to organize his neighborhood, which sits on the outskirts of Lviv. He helped make a call list of volunteers and a plan to address potholes and dumpsters. Another friend of mine, the owner of a small software company, is designing an online corruption-reporting platform. I hope they get a better future and the chance to pursue it in peace.